Special Reports & Older Documents
Publictransit.us is proud to introduce a revamped and reformatted series of “Special Reports” outlining our most recent public transit research and analysis. This page includes links to these documents, as well as older reports we have produced in our first three years of operation. We strongly recommend using the PDF versions of each paper if you wish to print the document; the PDF version retains all original formatting.
Abstracts for each Special Report and Selected Older Documents are listed after the Links Summary below.
Special Report No. 10, Preliminary Ridership Forecast for a Napa/Solano Rail Transit Network was added December 5, 2005.
1. Bus Rapid Transit in Curitiba, Brazil: An Information Summary
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr1.curitibaBRT.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr1.curitibaBRT.pdf
2. Traffic Density Thresholds for Rail Transit: A Retrospective
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr2.trafficdensityretrospective.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr2.trafficdensityretrospective.pdf
3. The Transit Field of Dreams: If You Provide It, Will They Come?
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr3.transitwilltheycome.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr3.transitwilltheycome.pdf
4. Supply Side Analysis & Verification of Ridership Forecasts: A Retrospective
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr4.supplysideretrospective.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr4.supplysideretrospective.pdf
5. Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm and Buhl: Déjà vu All Over Again?
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr5.Flyvbjerg_Deja_Vue.htm .
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr5.Flyvbjerg_Deja_Vue.pdf
6. Portland & Seattle Transit Operating Cost: Alternative Strategies Compared
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr6.PortlandvsSeattle.htm .
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr6.PortlandvsSeattle.pdf
7. Traffic Density Series
See Main Traffic Density Page:
http://www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/trafficdensity/sr7.trafficdensitylinks.htm
8. Ottawa: Transit Productivity and Bus Rapid Transit
Sorry, no HTML version available.
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr8.OttawaTransit.pdf
9. Monorails in Japan: An Overview
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr9.JapanMonorails.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr9.JapanMonorails.pdf
10. Preliminary Patronage Forecast for a Napa/Solano Rail Transit Network
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr10.forecastnapasolanorail.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr10.forecastnapasolanorail.pdf
EARLIER REPORTS
Rapid Bus and Rapid Rail: Peak Period Service Supply vs. Observed Passenger Utilization
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/modalcapacity5.htm (December 2003)
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/modalcapacity5.pdf (December 2003)
Supporting data-set:
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/PeakVeh.htm
Impact on Transit Patronage of Cessation or Inauguration of Rail Service
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/supplydemand/TRB1221.htm (January 1989)
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/supplydemand/TRB1221.pdf (January 1989)
REPORT ABSTRACTS
Special Report No. 1
Bus Rapid Transit in Curitiba, Brazil: An Information Summary
December 11, 2004. Leroy W. Demery, Jr.
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr1.curitibaBRT.htm .
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr1.curitibaBRT.pdf .
Abstract
The transit system in Curitiba, Brazil, has attracted worldwide attention for remarkable accomplishments with limited resources. In the U.S., Curitiba has become the veritable poster child for “bus rapid transit.” However, the most recent news is less than favorable: traffic is declining, a "vicious cycle" of fare increases has set in, a monorail project has been canceled owing to lack of financing, and the city has announced that it will study replacement of buses with “electric tramcars" – that is, surface light rail transit (LRT) – on the two busiest busways. Curitiba’s mayor announced in 2003 that the Metrô Leve (“Light Metro”) project would proceed. The purpose of this paper is to summarize available information, and to provide references and links.
Special Report No. 2
Traffic Density Thresholds for Rail Transit: A Retrospective
February 4, 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr., J. Wallace Higgins, Michael D. Setty
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr2.trafficdensityretrospective.htm .
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr2.trafficdensityretrospective.pdf .
Abstract
A 1982 report by Pushkarev et al., published by the New York Regional Plan Association, established a minimum traffic density threshold for low-cost light rail transit. Based on economic analysis of operating expense and potential savings in labor, energy and land, Pushkarev et al. concluded that light rail transit could be justified in corridors having a traffic density of 4,000 weekday passenger-miles per mile of route. Independent studies from other developed economies including Japan and Germany, and a historic analysis from the U.S., are found to corroborate this result.
The 1982 report by Pushkarev et al. recommended that U.S. total rail transit route length be doubled over 25 years. The program was not adopted but total rail route length, in operation or under construction, reached the recommended extent by 2004. Pushkarev et al. also estimated potential rail ridership in a number of cities. These forecasts were conservative, as revealed by results in cities that built new rail lines. Pushkarev et al. consistently underestimated weekday traffic density. In most cases, weekday peak-hour passenger volumes equal or exceed the implied minimum levels. These observations fail to support the assertion by Pickrell (1985) that Pushkarev et al. assumed unrealistically high levels of peak period travel.
Critiques of Pushkarev et al. (1982) by Pickrell (1985) and Kain (1988) have major conceptual flaws and technical errors. Such problematic analysis fails to support the findings and conclusions of Pickrell and Kain.
Additional research is indicated to update the findings of Pushkarev et al. using data from LRT facilities opened after 1982, and to establish threshold criteria for enhanced bus and bus rapid transit facilities. The authors believe that the number of U.S. corridors where traffic density justifies enhanced bus service probably numbers in the hundreds, compared to several dozen corridors where traffic density may justify new rail lines not yet built.
Special Report No. 3
The Transit Field of Dreams: If You Operate It, Will They Come?
May 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr., Michael D. Setty
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr3.transitwilltheycome.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr3.transitwilltheycome.pdf
Abstract
It is often claimed that the magnitude of the “transit riding habit” in a given city or urban region depends primarily on factors outside the control of political decision-makers and transit providers. This point of view is represented in a large percentage of academic literature dealing with transit written in the last forty years, including key works such as Meyer, Kain, and Wohl (1962), Kain (1988), Pickrell (1992), Taylor et al (2003), and by prominent conservative “think tank” transit critics such as Wendell Cox ( www.publicpurpose.com ), Randal O’Toole ( www.ti.org ). Far fewer works take the opposite view.
Mees (2000) argues
...With sensible planning, it is actually possible to have ‘European-style’ public transport, even in dispersed urban environments.”
According to Mees, until a “neo-conservative” government came to power in Ontario in the early 1990’s and drastically cut transit funding, Toronto, Canada, was able to maintain from 1950 to 1990 a transit riding habit in the range of 300 annual rides per capita, comparable to New York City proper, Munich, or Zurich. Toronto accomplished this feat because transit was often as much a political and funding prio ity as roadway expansion. Toronto’s European-level transit riding habit was nearly as high in 1990 as in 1950, despite typical levels of auto ownership, similar rapid auto-based suburban growth and decentralization, low gasoline prices, and development densities closer to the North American than European norm. According to Mees:
...Even though conventional economists will object, public transport needs to be supply-rather than demand-led. This is the way to achieve flexibility and innovation, and to respond to changing travel needs. As was noted in Chapter 5, it is only by offering a complete service that a public transport operator enables passenger demands to manifest themselves. One this has occurred, even questions about technology become easier to answer. For example, with an excellent bus service in place across an urban area, it is easy to select the promising sites for upgrades to light rail or busways: these will be the corridors with high, and rising, patronage.
The Mees point of view–that the level of transit patronage is primarily a function of the quality and quantity of service than any other factor, economic or demographic–is supported by the examples uncovered by the authors.
These include patronage increases experienced by Indiana electric interurban railways in the mid-1930’s (Hilton and Due, 1960), a demonstration that “long-run” service elasticities in Britain accurately predicts patronage changes (Dargay and Hanly 2001), the near perfect (r-squared = 0.96) relationship between service levles and transit riding habits in a random set of U.S. (Neuzil, 1975), and an almost perfect relationship (R2=0.96) between annual transit capacity and annual per capita transit passenger miles consumed, building on a 2001 data-set devel- oped by transit critic Wendell Cox at ( www.publicpurpose.com ).
Population density, size of urban area, regional per capita income, local tradition, and similar factors, have some influence on transportation usage, whether by transit or motor vehicle. But the authors are confident that the primary influence on per-capita consumption of transit service is the per capita level of transit capacity provided, which is an outcome of public policy choices, as argued by Mees (2000).
Special Report No. 4
Supply Side Analysis & Verification of Ridership Forecasts: A Retrospective
April 15, 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr.
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr4.supplysideretrospective.htm .
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr4.supplysideretrospective.pdf .
Abstract
Ridership carried by U.S. fixed-guideway transit projects opened from the mid-1980s typically fell short of levels forecast during early planning. Such forecasts failed to consider service-supply factors, or “practical” capacity as built. Disparity between forecast and observed ridership provides no grounds for conclusion that the forecast was “incorrect.” If the requisite service level was not provided, then the forecast was not tested. Using Sacramento’s light-rail starter system as an example, this paper demonstrates that the line, as built, was not capable of accommodating peak-period passenger volumes of the size implied by the early planning forecast of 50,000 passengers per weekday. The principal limiting factor, in this and other cases, was vehicle fleet size although train length and maximum service frequency limits are characteristic of light rail facilities. The paper summarizes research published a decade ago; transportation planners today have access to more data, greater analytical capability and lessons learned from the mid-1980s. One important example: transit consumers are evidently not willing to tolerate peak-hour crowding at levels once assumed by planners. Again, Sacramento offers clear and cogent proof, based on service-supply factors, that the LRT system “as built” could not carry the forecast 50,000 passengers per weekday, and that the “likely maximum” patronage was less than half the forecast. Acknowledgment of this fact may jeopardize the “forecaster bias” theory regarding new rail projects popular among some transport economists and academics.
Special Report No. 5
Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm and Buhl: Déjà vu All Over Again?
April 15, 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr., Michael D. Setty
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr5.Flyvbjerg_Deja_Vue.htm .
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr5.Flyvbjerg_Deja_Vue.pdf
Abstract
Publication in April 2005 of a new study by Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm and Søren L. Buhl brought back memories of an earlier work by the same authors.
The 2002 paper by Flyvbjerg et al., Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie? The 2005 paper, How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects? The Case of Transportation, was also published by the APA Journal.
Flyvbjerg (pronounced much like FLEW-byair; rhymes with "Pierre") and Buhl are professors at Aalborg University, Denmark. Skamris Holm is a planner with Aalborg Municipality.
The 2002 paper analyzed construction cost estimates for large public works projects using statistical methods. Flyvbjerg and his collaborators demonstrated a taste for very strongly worded allegations that they failed to document.
Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.
A cynic might describe the above as a flagrant strategy to garner attention, name recognition, publicity for upcoming projects – and to discourage criticism. The 2002 paper attracted much attention and stirred significant commentary, but little formal criticism followed. This does not surprise us. Many academics have a strong vested interest in their pet theory – that costs are systematically underestimated and utilization overestimated for large public works projects – and have little interest in criticism or “alternative” explanations. This, as we demonstrated in a previous post, has led to a situation where a paper with significant analytical flaws (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002) was followed by one with even greater flaws (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005). Nonetheless, a “rerun” of the 2002 media frenzy is all but certain.
This article reviews the issues related to Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) – and the ensuing media circus.
Special Report No. 6
Portland and Seattle Transit Operating Cost: Alternative Strategies Compared
May 1, 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr., Michael D. Setty
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr6.PortlandvsSeattle.htm .
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr6.PortlandvsSeattle.pdf
Abstract
The analysis of operating-cost “economy of scale” with regard to Portland light rail transit suggests a comparison to determine the relative cost efficiency of the “trunk-feeder” strategy with one emphasizing “one-seat” peak-period service connecting as many points as practical.
Portland opened a 30-mile east-west light-rail line between 1986 and 1998. Seattle, by contrast, developed extensive express-bus services from the early 1970s, and opened its downtown bus tunnel in 1990. The following comparison uses data for the 2001 fiscal year, reported to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) by the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (Tri-Met) and the King County Department of Transportation (King County Metro).
Conclusions:
1.) Annual transit use per capita, in terms of end-to-end or linked trips, was roughly equivalent in Portland and Seattle at FY 2001.
2.) Seattle spent $23 more per capita, or 13 percent more than Portland, for the same result.
3.) King County taxpayers spent 61 percent more in subsidy per annual boarding than Metro Portland taxpayers.
4.) King County taxpayers spent approximately 25 percent more in subsidy per linked transit trip than Metro Portland taxpayers. Part of this reflects Seattle’s longer travel distances, but the average linked transit trip in Seattle was not 25 percent longer than in Portland.
5.) Prospective savings to King County taxpayers were in the range of $70-$100 million annually if King County Metro achieved the same cost savings as Tri-Met from light-rail construction and operation of a trunk-feeder system configuration.
6. $70-$100 million in annual savings, assuming a 7 percent discount rate and 30-year project life, would offset capital investment in the range of $1 billion - $1.3 billion.
Special Report No. 7
Traffic Density Series
May 1, 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr., Michael D. Setty
PENDING
Abstract
Special Report No. 8
Ottawa: Transit Productivity and Bus Rapid Transit
July 1, 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr., Michael D. Setty
Sorry, no HTML version available.
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr8.OttawaTransit.pdf
Abstract
Ottawa, Canada’s capital, has the most extensive bus rapid transit (BRT) services in North America. The core “Transitway” network includes busways, reserved lanes and mixed traffic operation totalling 46.3 km (28.7 mi) , opened in stages from 1983.
Most performance indicators revealed significant negative trends as transitway service expanded. Ridership did not grow as anticipated prior to construction. Ridership declined during 1984-1997 despite increasing population and employment; ridership per-capita fell by almost 40 percent. The previous doubling of ridership during 1971-1984 was not sustainable absent major productivity gains: bus-km per capita tripled, inflation-adjusted operating expense per capita increased 2.5 times, and the revenue : cost ratio fell from 98 to 60 percent.
Productivity did not increase as transitway service expanded. Real wage rates remained stable during 1982-2002 but operating cost per revenue service hour rose by nearly 60 percent. Maintenance costs, fuel consumption, non-revenue (“deadhead”) km and road calls all increased while labor utilization became less efficient. Available data suggest, but merely suggest, a sharp increase in customer complaints coinciding with a period of decreasing service reliability and declining ridership. However, the undertaking managed to improve service effectiveness and so moderated the negative trends in cost-effectiveness.
The 1984-1997 ridership decrease is unfortunate but less troubling than productivity declines during the same period. These suggest “inherent” or “structural” inefficiencies associated with Ottawa’s transitway program. The implied annual cost is (2002 CAD) 65 million (2002 USD 42 million) based on 2002 service levels; the implied cumulative cost during 1982-2002 is (2002 CAD) 1,360 million (2002 USD 865 million) . Additional research is indicated to identify underlying causal factors and possible counter-strategies.
Special Report No. 9
Monorails in Japan: An Overview
June 22, 2005. Leroy W. Demery, Jr.
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr9.JapanMonorails.htm
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr9.JapanMonorails.pdf
Abstract
Japan has ten monorail lines with a total route length of about 110 km (70 mi) , worked by more than 300 vehicles, carrying about 500,000 passengers per day. Several short lines were built during a long formative period. Most of these have been closed (6 km / 10 mi total), but monorail technology was proven practical. Two large-scale prototypes were built, including the well-known Tôkyô Monorail. Design standards for supported and suspended monorails were adopted, and criteria for application were established. Practical considerations have limited monorails to special-purpose applications, where surface right-of-way is not available and traffic is not sufficient to justify full-scale rail lines, either in tunnel or on viaduct. (No meaningful distinction between "light rail" and "heavy rail" can be made in Japan.) Most monorail lines were built along new expressways and surface roads. At mid-2005, the only active monorail projects were short extensions to three existing systems. No "new" monorail systems were under planning, according to Japanese-language sources. By contrast, many new rail lines were under construction or planned. There was also considerable interest in "LRT," which in Japan refers to modern tramway systems using low-floor cars. Japanese monorail lines will continue to expand, if slowly, but play a very small role in the overall transport picture. Conventional rail will remain the dominant mode for major urban corridors for the foreseeable future.
Earlier Reports
Rapid Bus and Rapid Rail: Peak Period Service Supply vs. Observed Passenger Utilization
Leroy W. Demery, Jr. and J. Wallace Higgins
Abstract
Travel demand and service supply interact to create transit service consumption, e.g. ridership. Demand analysis receives greater attention during planning, but supply issues are often overlooked. This analysis demonstrates strong correlation between peak service supply and consumption, permitting prediction of peak service consumption from supply levels within a fairly broad demand range. Peak consumption levels assumed by some previous studies are found to have been unrealistically high. Consequently, costs for various bus and rail projects have proven higher, and ridership lower, than predicted during planning. Crowding often discourages patronage in markets where consumers have competitive alternatives to public transit service. This occurs at crowding levels significantly lower than the "capacity" figures assumed by transit planners. Peak-period service consumption patterns suggest a significant and observable consumer preference for rail.
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/modalcapacity5.htm (December 2003)
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/modalcapacity5.pdf (December 2003)
Supporting data-set:
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/PeakVeh.htm
Impact on Transit Patronage of Cessation or Inauguration of Rail Service
Edson L. Tennyson, P.E
Abstract
Many theorists believe that transit service mode has little influence on consumer choice between automobile and transit travel. Others believe that they have noted a modal effect in which rail transit attracts higher ridership than does bus when other factors are about equal. Given environmental concerns and the large investment needed for guided transit, a better understanding of this issue is essential, especially for congested areas. A consideration of the history of automobile and transit travel in the United States can be helpful in comprehending the nature of the problem. After World War II, availability of vehicles, fuel, and tires spurred growth of both private automobile use and use of buses for transit. Analyses of the effects of both this growth and the improvements in rail systems that were added during the same period reveal that transit mode does indeed make a significant difference in the level of use of a transit facility. This factor must be included in future alternative analysis studies if reliable patronage determinations are to be made.
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/supplydemand/TRB1221.htm (January 1989)
www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/supplydemand/TRB1221.pdf (January 1989)